When I think “Jew,” I see him as European. A thoroughly subjective vision, to be sure, but is there not, at the root of all rational reflection, first of all a preconception that one then dresses up with rational elements to make it acceptable to others — and to oneself? And so, for me, the Jew is, in essence, of Europe. Having delivered that pronouncement, some retouching is in order: the idea does not apply, stricto sensu, to the Israelis (whatever Israel’s desire to regard itself as a country of Europe, at odds with its real surroundings). Nor does it apply to the Jews of America, even if they, or their parents, did one day come from Europe. And then it does not concern the Jews of North Africa either (at least before their arrival and their taking root on the old continent), nor the exotic ones of Asia or of distant Africa… All things considered, my initial vision applies only to a small fraction of the Jewish people: to those who resemble me. In which case only the Jews of Europe would qualify as European Jews. Stumbling over this personal self-evidence defines the subject of this reflection: the Jews of Europe in Europe, facing a Europe in mutation; today and tomorrow.
Prologue
The Jew of Europe (I say this as one says “the elephant of Asia” or “the Siberian tiger”…) is a particular species, a species alleged to be threatened, even on the way to extinction — through dissolution into the surrounding milieu. Indeed, after having, for centuries, represented the great majority of the Jewish people, this group, tragically reduced during the Second World War, keeps losing numbers, whether to the benefit of the other gathering places (or dispersal points) of the Jewish people, or through the involuntary loss of identity of individuals, or even through its outright renunciation. For communitarian Europe today, the Europe of the West and the North (it is true that there remain countries such as Greece, which must for the moment be set aside in the argument that follows), has become a land tolerant enough toward Jews that they tend to dissolve into it… This is not the place to expound on the secularization of the greater part of European Jews, on the progressive loss of their cultural identity, or on the exogamous marriages they widely practice; yet it is an established fact that the disparate human group now formed by the Jews of Europe is losing in numerical importance and also in its relative weight within the Jewish people as a whole — a fact of which we are perhaps not sufficiently aware, and whose full consequences we fail to measure.
A little history…
Leafing through his history, one notes that the European Jew, the persecuted minority figure, was an incessant migrant, a perpetual traveler. Was it in his temperament? Was it the persecutions of the Christians that set him wandering from one end of the continent to the other, before driving him off to the Americas? Both, assuredly. In any case, he steadfastly embodied the figure of the Wandering Jew with which others had burdened him. This need, this vital necessity of moving about the European space, had made of the Jew a sort of paradoxical anarchist, a sworn enemy of borders, of tolls and of barrier-keepers of every kind, obstacles to his migrations or his flights. At the same time, they gave him a vaster vision of geographic space than that of the settled, endowed with a patch of land. He acquired and kept, in all ages, the habit of communicating with his brothers in other communities, even distant ones, by way of travelers, peddlers, pilgrims, fugitives, or emigrants. For if knowing what was happening, what was brewing elsewhere, was for others a mere theme of curiosity, for the Jew it was often a condition necessary to his survival. Curious testimonies of this openness to the world are to be found in the goyim’s vision of the Jew: the Jew is the one who knows before others what is happening elsewhere. The “Arab telephone” is an inexact expression: the phenomenon had obvious antecedents among “our” Jews. Thus, three centuries ago and more, when a noble landowner of the Polish countryside engaged a Jew to manage his estate, the parties would sign a formal contract defining their respective obligations. And among the Jew’s various obligations was, notably, that of regularly informing his employer about what was happening in the wide world…
This more global, broader vision of affairs and of geography later led the Jews either to internationalism or to cosmopolitanism, the qualifier used depending somewhat on the degree of hostility of the one observing the Jew. The Jew’s natural vocation has been to transcend local antagonisms (the “parish-pump quarrels,” if I may say so…) in order to turn toward vaster horizons. They had the European vocation before most Europeans, sensing the prospects that an effacement of traditional borders and local antagonisms would offer. In short, the vaster a living space, the more at ease the Jew is within it.
The Europe of the optimists
Thus the lessons of history ought to inspire in the Jews a logical European enthusiasm. To be able to move more freely, indeed without any hindrance, within an enlarged space is unquestionably of greater appeal to the uprooted or the uprootable than to the immemorially settled. So let us imagine, for a moment, the unimaginable: the coming to power of the extreme right in France, with consequences echoing a fairly recent past, notably as regards anti-Jewish measures (this is, of course, a purely imaginary exercise, and events as improbable as were the measures actually taken by Vichy). Hop! Here are the Jews of France gone off to the other end of the Schengen area, under conditions of which those of 1492, for instance, would not have dared to dream… But enough of nightmares.
One would of course have liked to begin this paragraph by asserting that, thanks to a united Europe, the very idea of an extreme right in power had become obsolete; but political reality sometimes defies logic, and it is no longer possible to be so optimistic. Let us at least hold that Europe’s weight will remain a moderator and an inhibitor of the most extreme expressions of racist, and in particular antisemitic, ideas. The Treaty of Nice, should it end up ratified, would among other things make it possible to exercise effective coercive action (alas, limited) against a government that would no longer wish to respect a minimum of rules of democratic fairness. The future will tell whether European construction will be accompanied by a more evident supranational “right of oversight” in the internal affairs of a member country than is now the case (one recalls Austria); one senses how difficult the idea is to get accepted by the sovereigntists, but plainly there are cases in which it would be no heresy.
The Europe of the pessimists
The birth of a supranational Europe is taking place during a period when other convulsions are shaking the Old World, and notably the disappearance of the Eastern bloc and of state communism, with the breakup of several of the countries that belonged to it, in convulsions sometimes dramatic. With, too, terrible ethnic conflicts, the generalized exacerbation of nationalisms, and a strong surge of centrifugal tendencies on the part of minorities that not long ago had no hope of obtaining autonomy, let alone independence.
These phenomena are not the direct consequence of European construction, but the interdependence is obvious and the examples are contagious; the cracks in the state edifices of Eastern Europe encourage the irredentist minorities of the West. Inevitably, the simultaneous appearance, above and beyond the former European states, of a supranational entity favors, within the member states, the rise of identitarian aspirations among minorities, both regional and non-territorial. The historical borders of the European states often ran right through the middle of linguistic regions, artificially separating members of one and the same cultural family. In France the Catalans, the Basques, the Flemish-speakers are the examples traditionally cited. But some of the minorities whose entire homeland is included within a single state also aspire, in an exasperated manner, to autonomy.
The appearance of a supranational European authority comes to weaken somewhat each State’s grip on its citizen-subjects, fostering in them the awakening of hopes no longer merely identitarian but also autonomist. From the cultural one passes to the political (but in any case, how is one to separate the two?). One observes this in a state such as ours, where historical vicissitudes, and perhaps also the national genius, had led to the establishment of a strong, centralized State, under the kings as much as in the time of the Republic. (That the latter acted out of a concern for the equality of individuals in no way thwarted the constant concern to create a single State.) We all know the role of the secular school in the nineteenth century in erasing particularisms and creating free, equal, and interchangeable citizens… It is thus that Louis Armand, a European of the first hour, came to say: I am for Europe, because it is within Europe that I shall be able to be a Savoyard.
In other parts of our continent, of more federal tradition, such as Germany or Italy, the appearance of the European entity and identity has likewise contributed to the strengthening of local particularisms. Henceforth countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, or again Spain offer significant examples of concessions made by traditional states to their territorial minorities. This movement is reinforced by the fact that Europe, out of a concern to defend and protect the aspirations of the weakest, displays a will to encourage the development of local cultural and linguistic particularisms, holding that everyone has the right to preserve his own heritage and to enrich his identity with it. European funding comes to be added to what decentralization offers, in support of cultural and educational initiatives.
Now, it is certain that such a movement, alongside its visible advantages, harbors dangers of which Europe has recently had multiple examples. The flourishing of the regions, yes, but how far? Can there be a legitimate and clear limit to particularism? Can the cultural stop short before political demand? From identity to autonomy, from autonomy to independence, the road seems to be one. The dramatic breakup of Yugoslavia, the more discreet one of Czechoslovakia, the bloody convulsions of the Spanish Basque Country, of Northern Ireland, of Kosovo, of Macedonia, show the perversions of communitarian demands. Has Europe — which today is logically led to strive to defuse, if not to prevent, bloody conflicts (without, in truth, having either the authority or the means to do so) — first contributed to fostering these centrifugal movements? Indirectly, certainly, by the mere fact that its emergence, concomitant with the breakup of the Eastern bloc, altered the traditional equilibria.
The exacerbation of the “little” nationalisms
…which leads straight to the dramas of ethnic cleansing, the desire to preserve one’s identity and one’s territory (a territory that sometimes has to be re-created) from any encroachment and, in fact, from all “others” — that of course runs counter to the great European federating current. Above all, it threatens the “sub-minorities” included within these new entities that are asserting themselves in every region of the continent. The Slovaks, freed from what they regarded as an unbearable Czech tutelage, treat “their” Gypsies or their Magyars no better. The Hungarians bully the Roma. The Romanians discriminate against the Hungarians. The Bulgarians Slavicize their Turks. The list is long.
The Jews are particularly sensitive to these upheavals. The example of those of Bosnia, settled in the Balkans for centuries (since the expulsion from Spain), is telling. Those of Sarajevo, so exemplary during the fratricidal war (their “Benevolencija,” an NGO born during the conflict to bring aid to the victims, did not limit its activity to the Jewish community alone; it assisted, without discrimination, all the victims), have in their great majority ended up leaving the city and the country, judging the experience too bitter. Yet another traditional hearth of Jewish presence on the way to disappearance. Is this not an example of what awaits the Jews of Europe if narrowly ethnic demands become widespread? If tomorrow a Brittany is proclaimed for the (only?) Bretons, a Euzkadi for the Basques, a Corsica reserved for the Corsicans, and so on, where then will the Jews find their place, and the Gypsies, the Armenians, and then the immigrants of every origin?
Traditionally, the Jews of the different regions of Europe often made themselves the allies of local national demands; thus in the nineteenth century their participation in the national struggles of the Poles or the Hungarians against the imposed imperial power was plain. Later, they often put their energy at the service of internationalism, seeing in it a radiant future for humanity and also their own liberation: the two facets of the Jews’ aspiration to general justice and freedom, and of their hope of benefiting from it themselves. What is one to conclude today from these attempts? Have they all failed?
…Toward a larger Europe?
An unprecedented aspect of the Jews’ relations with Europe is taking shape with the prospect of the imminent admission into the European Union of certain countries of the East. This admission poses many problems, notably economic ones, difficulties that seem to obscure an aspect of particular importance to us: countries such as Poland, Lithuania, Romania are hearths of endemic antisemitism. How is one to foresee the impact of this admission on the fragile Jews–Goyim equilibrium, both there and in “our” Europe? The pessimist will imagine Oriental antisemitism gaining regions where its virulence had disappeared or at least faded, if only as a result of the arrival in the West of large masses of workers in search of better wages. The optimist will prefer to believe that Western influence will reach the East and contribute to eradicating at last a visceral hostility in these traditional hearths. Where lies the truth? One cannot shake off a certain unease: in this sort of matter, the irrational often gains the upper hand. What is certain is that entry into Europe will be a relief for the Jews who still reside today in the countries of the East; they will feel more reassured, freer. It is possible, moreover, that a significant portion will take the opportunity to migrate westward. And for their part, the Jews of Western Europe, a significant portion of whom have roots in Eastern Europe, will yield more readily to the temptation not only to visit the region of their ancestors (might one already dare to glimpse the durable return of Jews there?), but also perhaps to recover a little despoiled real estate — an idea currently often inhibited not only by irrational blockages but also by the apparent difficulty of the undertaking. For how can one forget, for example, that the property of ten percent of the Polish population was seized by strangers during the Second World War, after the tragic death of its former owners?
To conclude?
In their long history as a persecuted minority, the Jews have on the whole accommodated themselves better to a king holding his subjects firmly in hand, to a strong state, to a central authority from which they could hope to find protection against exactions and riots (this observation does not neglect, of course, the fact that several of these kings had taken particularly cruel measures against their Jews, expelling them or forcing them to abandon their identity). By virtue of which we ought today to be rather sovereigntist, defenders of the traditional States that have codified obligations toward all their citizens, and to be more wary before a Europe full of uncertainties, one that may prove incapable of defending weak and dispersed communities. In truth, to explore the prospects that the European future offers to the Jews is an exercise belonging to the crystal ball. One may nonetheless think that the life of European Jews will be affected by it, just like that of the “others,” and a little more than that of the “others.” Simply because we are not quite like the others…
