Israelis and Palestinians, after a year of the Rabin government.

An interview with Gavri BARGIL, Director of Shalom Akhshav (Peace Now)

Izio ROSENMAN (IR): Gavri Bargil, the first question I would like to put to you is this: after nearly fifteen years of Likud government, the first year of a left-wing government has now elapsed. What is your analysis of the situation, and what are the chances for peace now?

Gavri BARGIL: Well, if we look at the first year of this government, we have to recognize one very important thing: one can be critical of much of what the government is doing, but it is certain that there is a very great difference between the two governments. You know, the Shamir government was not at all involved in this peace process. Now we know, because we speak to the Prime Minister and to members of the government, that this government is genuinely committed, that it is very serious where peace is concerned. Nevertheless, I would add that after a year of this government we still have quite a few doubts. The Rabin government, which is leading this process — even though there are very fine people in it, driven by the best of intentions — we are not sure that it is really doing what is needed to reach peace. So there are two aspects: the government is very serious, and on the face of it is doing all that is needed to reach peace, but we believe that at this point, after a year, the government has not done enough as regards substance. Nevertheless, if one asks what the chances for peace are, I would say they have grown: there are ups and downs, but it seems to us that we can be optimistic.

IR: What difference do you perceive between the Rabin government and the Shamir government?

GB: There are many small things on the ground that show an effort is being made to improve the quality of life, human rights; the problem is that not enough has been done. Not enough progress has been made in the peace process. What we are saying is that the government must state very clearly, for both parties, what the objectives it is pursuing actually are. Rabin’s greatest mistake, from the outset, is that he followed Shamir’s formula. It is good to be a tough negotiator at the start. But if one wants to conclude an agreement — in business or in anything else — one must first state what one wants to achieve in the end, and only then discuss the details. So if the other party knows exactly where we want to get to, things could be done more openly. The objective, of course, is to achieve peace, and so it should be stated clearly that we no longer wish to dominate the Palestinians; after that we will tackle the smaller problems. Unfortunately Rabin did exactly the opposite; he went to Washington and began negotiating over thousands of small problems. They are all very important, these small problems; but the most important thing is to tell the Palestinians: “you are moving toward autonomy, but fundamentally what we want is, after these three years, to reach an agreement, which will mean that the problem must be resolved, and that will mean we will no longer control the West Bank.” This does not yet seem very [clear].

[Is it clear?] We are not proposing anything very precise; we are not, of course, speaking of an independent State, but we are not speaking of a precise political solution either. The Shamir government said it wanted autonomy, but it also said “we leave all options open.” That was fine for the Shamir government, but there is no reason for the present government to leave it at that. We know very well what public opinion is, as well as that of Labor or of Meretz: namely, that a three-year period is needed for autonomy. Even today, before beginning the autonomy, we do not think that afterward we will continue to control these Territories. Why not say so? It would clarify the matter. And the Palestinians will feel stronger, more confident in what they are doing if they know that after the autonomy there will not be our domination. The Palestinians are afraid that after three years of autonomy they will remain stuck in the autonomy. The present government must say that it does not intend to keep the Territories forever. Autonomy is only a three-year stage; and then we will discuss the final stage.

IR. Don’t you think that the reason the Rabin government does not state things clearly, and does not say what the final goal is, is because it is afraid of public opinion?

GB. Yes. Maybe it is indeed afraid of public opinion. But what is that opinion? There is one thing we already know, which is that the dream of Greater Israel is dead. We really do know that public opinion is ready. I see that even the settlers, when they go to demonstrate, no longer speak at all of Greater Israel. They speak of security, but no one speaks any longer of Greater Israel. Not only Likud, but even the settlers no longer speak of Greater Israel. They know it is something that no longer works in public opinion. I am not saying that the mass of the population in Israel has already accepted our views, but they think there must be a separation, a political separation, between Israel and the Palestinians. People realize there is no other way out. If Rabin makes a peace agreement, any agreement at all, well, it will be accepted. It is up to us to push in that direction; but whatever peace agreement Rabin reaches, it will have the support of public opinion.

IR. But don’t you think that now that the left is in power, this may paradoxically paralyze the peace campaign in Israel? That is to say, people may be afraid of making things difficult for the government, because many people who were in Shalom Akhshav are now in the government, and one cannot embarrass them.

GB. No, it is not a matter of changing the rules of the game here. Things have sometimes become more difficult, but these are difficulties we are familiar with. I am not saying we should have stayed in opposition, I do not regret it. I think it is a good thing that we now have people in the government, and one must of course now play things a little differently than before. We can say that we are not committed to one government or another, we defend our ideas. What we are doing today is being a friendly opposition. We are not subservient to the government; we said so very clearly to the government in the matter of the deportees, for example. We were the only ones to rise up against those deportations. So, even though our task may perhaps be made more difficult, pressure must be applied in the direction of peace. I would say, all the same, that this government will do everything to bring a peace agreement to the people of Israel. And we will provide it that support for as long as this peace process continues; we will be that friendly opposition. But we have here the best government for advancing this process. We want this government to remain in power, we must apply pressure to reach a historic agreement. But we are not going to support it no matter what it does. So our duty is to apply pressure. But from the moment there is a peace agreement, public opinion will accept and support this effort. Of course the right will do everything to stop these things, but our duty will be to bring the support of the street.

IR. Has this public debate on the Territories really begun?

GB. Yes. But it also depends on what happens in the peace process. Each time there is a lowering of tension, each time Assad or Arafat says something, it has some influence on the peace process. But I believe there will be a good deal of movement in the street on both sides once things begin to move.

IR. What are the recent activities through which Shalom Akhshav has made itself felt in relation to public opinion?

GB. We recently held a press conference. We are going to launch a large public campaign to call on the government to commit itself to a courageous peace initiative. We were saying that we extend credit to the government, that it wants peace, but that, as regards substance, the substance of peace, this is not enough. In Shamir’s day it was already something to bring Shamir to peace talks, but now that is no longer enough. To make breakthroughs, to go further, an opening is needed. So we have already begun to act in our customary way. We begin with small activities, small groups, and then we will act more or less everywhere and make things stronger and stronger. When one is in opposition things are a little different, but we can talk with this or that minister. Most of the ministers, of the members of the government, are friends. We meet with them on a regular basis.

IR. Do the media report on your activity?

GB. Yes — you know, the media normally report news about big things. In the public’s mind we are a mass movement and we must hold large demonstrations. But at present we do not think that is the most important thing. In the meantime we do many things politically that are important, that are lobbying. We use the trust, the good relations we also have with the Palestinian leadership, to bring about something. We talk both with the Palestinian representatives and with our own government.

IR. Precisely — what are your relations with the Palestinians in the present conjuncture, namely at this very violent stage of the Intifada?

GB. Our relations with the Palestinians, especially with the leadership, are a good example of what can be shown to the Israeli population: how relations are established between Palestinians and Israelis, how they ought to be on the whole. We meet with them, we talk with them. And when one meets, when one talks, one can build trust. Many fears can be overcome. And we have maintained these relations for some years now; we have built a very good climate of trust on both sides, and I believe it is a trust that allows us to overcome many problems that have arisen on the Palestinian side as well as on the Israeli side. They know, they understand, we know, that we are fighting for the same thing. We have learned to know one another, to trust one another. We have meetings with them constantly, on a thoroughly regular, periodic basis. Sometimes we make a public demonstration of it, it is true, when we think it necessary; but we meet them regularly, without it being under the spotlight, we try to explain to them what the problems of public opinion in Israel are, and they explain their problems to us.

We confront our respective problems. We meet them in private practically every week. We exchange ideas. I wanted to tell you here one thing that is of historic importance: even though we are far from the media, what we are doing there is, I believe, important in sustaining the peace camp on the Palestinian side. In giving them, even at the present time, the sense that there are many people in Israel who want peace, who aspire to it and who are doing everything to advance it. If we look at what has happened in recent years, one of the historic things we have done since the Intifada began is to continue talking with the Palestinian side, and we thereby give more power to the Palestinian peace camp to carry on.

IR. There are sometimes people outside who think that the peace camp among the Palestinians is small, weak, and that it is increasingly becoming a minority?

GB. No. I can tell you that this is not entirely accurate. When one sees what is happening in the West Bank and in Gaza, when one talks to people, when one talks to those in charge, one sees that this is not so. Just consider one thing: when, at the end of the first round of negotiations, the Palestinian delegation returned to the West Bank, the Palestinians welcomed them as heroes, and then the Intifada stopped for a few days. Then something happened to which the army did not know how to respond: the Palestinians came up to the soldiers and gave them flowers; what could prove better than that how fed up people are with the present situation? They are very close to a compromise with Israel, they are ready to make concessions. But they themselves need a hope to nourish them in their endeavor, and if we can give them that hope we can arrive at historic breakthroughs. The problem is simply that, as time passes, they get the impression that the peace talks are nothing but talks and that nothing will come of them but words, while the situation in the refugee camps only grows worse. They believe less and less in the peace process, and so they turn to violence. It is despair that drives them to violence — we know that.

IR. You know, this is something that is not very clear in the Diaspora.

GB. Things must be spelled out. There are extremists who will do anything to stop the process, but we know very well that we have extremists in Israel too. But the question is whether it is only a matter of terrorist groups. Well, we and the Palestinians can do things to stop them. But the question is where the mass of the Palestinian people will go. Will the mass of the Palestinian people go with the PLO or will it go with Hamas — and that depends on us. On whether despair drives it. If we give them the feeling that they can improve the situation, they will go with the peace camp. If we do not give them that hope, they will go with Hamas. And I believe this is an important thing, of which we must convince the government. The Palestinians’ situation is totally different from Syria’s. When one is dealing with Syria, these are two countries talking; it may take a year, it may take two years. As long as both parties want to reach a peace agreement we will get there little by little. And there too one must take initiatives with regard to Syria.

There, time does not work against us. But with the Palestinians, time works against us. If the peace camp loses hope, if the Palestinians lose hope, they will follow Hamas. We must therefore act quickly.

IR. Do you think the situation is getting worse?

GB. No. I must say, in any case, that time does not work in our favor in the West Bank. So one must move fast. One must take time into our own hands to obtain that autonomy for them, to give hope to the Palestinians. I believe this will improve the situation on both sides. With the Palestinians we are dealing with a delegation, a Palestinian delegation whose only power, whose only prerogative in a sense, is to bring hope to their people.

IR. How does the situation of civil rights, the situation of human rights, present itself? Is it getting worse?

GB. There are many things the present government has done to improve the situation of civil rights on the ground in the West Bank, as I told you at the start. But since nothing has happened in the political arena, things are getting worse. Because there is a vicious circle of violence. If nothing is done, people are in despair, and at that point Hamas grows stronger, violence grows stronger. That acts once again in a negative direction on any progress. So there is a circle of violence that must be broken, and the only way to break it is to make progress toward peace.

IR. If one sees things from the outside, from the Diaspora, the contacts with the Palestinians, these daily contacts you have, are not perceived at all. So what one also sees in the new peace process is violence — violence against Jews, and there is also the violence exercised against the Palestinians, in violation of civil rights. What can be done to change opinion, to show that there are things moving in this direction, things that can be done between Israelis and Palestinians? Is there anything that has been done in recent months?

GB. Well, we have open contacts with the Palestinians all the time. We have meetings with small groups in the West Bank all the time, but doing something in public depends on the political situation. At present I do not believe it would be productive, that it would be good either for them or for us. If the situation improves somewhat, if progress is made in the negotiations on autonomy, then I think we will be able to do something a little more visible, a little more public.

IR. What could be the contribution of the Jewish Diaspora to helping both peace and the peace camp in Israel?

GB. For years the governments of Israel have tried to educate the Diaspora. I believe that the Jewish communities around the world constitute a very great force and have a great deal of influence over what happens in Israel. We need the Diaspora’s help, for Israel as a whole, but above all for the peace camp. There should be an open dialogue between Israel and the Jewish communities. We cannot say to the Diaspora, we want to keep open relations with you, but do not tell us what you think of the situation. Any group attached to peace, within a community, should speak up and speak loud and clear. One must not keep silent. If one takes the standpoint of love for Israel, one can say “this or that is not right in Israel.” It was a mistake of the Shamir government to say that because Diaspora Jews do not live in Israel they have only the right to keep silent. No, one must not support a government just because it is a government. If we had a Moledet government, would it really have to be supported just because it is a government of Israel? No.

What the Rabin government is doing is changing the Israeli public, which realizes that the situation is evolving. I believe that the messianic thinking that was Likud’s no longer works. Public opinion now knows that one can no longer control the Palestinians. This domination cannot continue.

Many people say: “there was just a small change: there are only nine seats separating Likud.” No — today nine seats is a lot. It is a lot because it amounts to a shift between Likud and Labor that counts; there was a significant transfer of votes, and those who try to minimize this transfer are dreaming wide awake.

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