Water in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: an attempt at demythification.

by Gershon Baskin.

Water is a commodity. In the water-rich regions of the world, water is bought and sold like oil, rice, or even gold. In the water-poor regions of the world, wars are launched for control of water resources.

Our region is obviously a water-poor region. The wars in the Middle East, even though they were not waged directly over water, have always had water present, even if it appeared only as a marginal preoccupation. Is the conflict “over water” between Israel and the Palestinians the kind of conflict liable to lead to war? Is the question of water even a major question in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Many researchers answer “yes” to both these questions. This article is a first attempt to bring the question of water between Israel and Palestine back to more realistic proportions. It will try to “demythify” the problem of water in this particular aspect of the conflict. The article does not minimize the question of water with regard to Israeli-Syrian relations; but the emphasis here is solely on the Israeli-Palestinian track.

Israel and Palestine are both part of the Jordan basin, so both can be regarded as competitors for the same limited hydrological resources. The Jordan is about 360 km long and irrigates a total area of 18,300 km². The portion of the river that concerns Israeli-Palestinian relations is the lower part of the Jordan, flowing from the Sea of Galilee southward through the West Bank into the Dead Sea. This water is rather salty, since its sources are chiefly irrigation return flows as well as water coming from saline springs. There are about 100 million m³ per year of salt water available from this source.

The principal source of water for the West Bank (of the Jordan) is what is commonly called the mountain aquifer. The mountain aquifer is a trans-boundary water source shared between Israel and Palestine. The greater part of the recharge area (where the rain falls) of the mountain aquifer is located in the West Bank. About 75% of the recharge area lies in the Palestinian territories. However, the current optimal pumping areas lie on the western side of the “Green Line” and Israel proper. This stems from the topography of the region (the most economical area for pumping water lies in the plains inside Israel). Thus Israel, which uses the greater part of the water from the mountain aquifer, effectively pumps this water in Israel proper. This water source accounts for about 25% of Israel’s total water consumption.

The mountain aquifer can be divided into three sub-aquifers: the western aquifer, the north-eastern aquifer, and the eastern aquifer.

The western aquifer flows naturally toward the Mediterranean Sea, toward the outlet at Rosh Ha’ayin (Ras al Ain) of the Yarkon River (el Uja) near Tel Aviv. The north-eastern aquifer likewise drains naturally toward Israel into the areas of Yezreel and Bet Shean. The eastern aquifer drains naturally toward the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea area. Of the three sub-sections of the mountain aquifer, only the western and north-eastern sub-sections are trans-boundary water resources shared between Israel and Palestine. The eastern aquifer is a purely Palestinian water resource and need not concern Israel.

Quantities and functions.

Let us look at the figures: The total potential of the mountain aquifer is estimated at some 632 million m³/year (Mmcy), which include 452 mmcy of fresh water and 180 mmcy of salt water. Within this quantity, the eastern aquifer (which is a purely Palestinian water resource) contains 81 mmcy of fresh water and 70 mmcy of salt water. The north-eastern aquifer contains 61 mmcy of fresh water and 70 mmcy of salt water, while the western aquifer contains 310 mmcy of fresh water and 40 mmcy of salt water. Thus, based on these data, the water in conflict in the West Bank totals 371 mmcy of fresh water and 110 mmcy of salt water.

The total quantity of water available from the mountain aquifer is 623 mmcy, of which Israel uses 413 mmcy (fresh and salt) or 66% of the aquifer’s total. This corresponds to about 23% of Israel’s total consumption (total consumption is estimated at 1,800 mmcy). Of the quantity of fresh water available from this source, Israel consumes 303 mmcy or 67%. An additional 35 mmcy of fresh water is currently used by Israeli settlements from the eastern aquifer, which is a purely Palestinian source, making total Israeli consumption of fresh water from the mountain aquifer equal to 338 mmcy. There remains to the Palestinians a total of 110 mmcy (90 mmcy of fresh water and 20 mmcy of salt water), corresponding to 20% of the fresh water and 17.4% of the total.

The negotiations over water between Israel and Palestine must not be blown out of proportion. This is not a question that can break the Israeli economy. The Palestinians, on the other hand, with a GNP of 3 billion dollars, can hardly at the present time afford to invest large capital in desalination projects.

In the West Bank (for the Palestinians), water has two basic functions: domestic use and agricultural use. (Industrial use of water in the West Bank is currently very low.) In 1990, total water consumption in the West Bank (by the Palestinians) amounted to 118 million m³ (mmc): 29 mmc for domestic use, 8 mmc for industry, and 84 mmc for agriculture. The rest, 3 mmc over and above the quantity available from the mountain aquifer, comes from domestic collection and from the Jordan River. Professor Hisham Awartani has calculated the water needs of the West Bank in the year 2005, when its population will be 2.24 million. His estimates are as follows: 144.7 mmc for domestic use, 29 mmc for industry, and 244 mmc for agriculture. Today per capita water use in the West Bank is 31 m³ per person, and current per capita use in Israel is 100 m³ per person. Professor Awartani anticipates an increase in water consumption in the West Bank that will reach 64.6 m³ per person in 2005.

Water needs.

When calculating the total water needs of the West Bank, it is important to determine how water is used. The agricultural sector is the largest consumer of water. Today, almost a quarter of the Palestinian population is employed in agriculture, which accounts for about a quarter of the gross domestic product. The percentage of people employed in agriculture will probably decrease as more modern technologies are used; however, the percentage of irrigated land will increase (and must increase) if there is more water available.

In the West Bank there is 5.87 [million] dunums of land. Today about 95,000 dunums are irrigated. According to Awartani, there are a total of 172,000 dunums suitable for irrigation (suitable being understood here as economically viable in terms of crop production) and an additional 440,000 dunums that could be suitable for certain types of irrigated agriculture, giving a total of 612,000 [dunums] of irrigable land. With an average of 700 m³ per dunum, the agricultural water need in the West Bank in the year 2005 will be 424.4 mmcy. Together with domestic and industrial needs, the Palestinians in the West Bank will need 602.1 mmcy (at 1992 levels of use in agriculture, which will probably decrease with the arrival of advanced technologies). This coincides with the quantity of water available from the mountain aquifer, namely 623 mmcy.

Fresh water is not only a basic product that can be used; it can also be produced (unlike oil). How much is water worth? The effective price of water is determined by the marginal cost of supplying additional or replacement water at a given location. The highest price that water should not exceed is estimated at about 80 cents (4 FF) per m³ (1992 price). This represents the cost of desalination at the seashore. Israel, which uses 413 mmcy from the mountain aquifer, must also take into account the cost of transporting the water, which in some cases is almost as high as the cost of production. Using certain complex mathematical calculations, it appears that the cost of replacing the West Bank water for Israel would be about US$1.00 per m³. Consequently, at present, if Israel renounces a total claim on the mountain aquifer, the total cost of replacing its water would not exceed US$413 million, which represents 0.67% of Israel’s GNP in 1993.

Water… 0.67% of Israel’s GNP in 1993.

Would a nation go to war for so small a sum of money?

On the basis of this analysis, the entire conflict over water between Israel and the Palestinians concerning the mountain aquifer comes down to 0.67% of Israel’s GNP in 1993. Would a nation go to war for so small a sum of money? This figure is to be reduced still further if one takes into account the fact that the Palestinians are not presently ready to increase their water demand significantly. It will take a certain number of years before the Palestinian agricultural sector is ready to reach the consumption levels indicated above. The time thus gained would allow Israel to prepare large-scale desalination projects.

Desalination.

Desalination projects will be the object of strong future demand in the region. There will not be enough water for any of the countries of the Jordan basin within a generation. There is, however, an unlimited quantity of salt water available in the sea. There is also a substantial quantity of salt water available in the fossil-water lakes beneath the Negev desert, and this groundwater allows for more economical desalination than seawater.

It would seem logical, since desalination will ultimately have to provide the answer to the region’s water needs, that these projects begin today. The international community seems willing to invest in these large regional projects. Israel, because of its relative wealth and its technological capacities, should be the region’s leader in these efforts.

Israel has often suggested that the Palestinians should look to desalination to solve their water problems. Surely, if this solution is good for the Palestinians, it must also be good for Israel. The negotiations over water between Israel and the Palestinians must not be blown out of proportion. This is not a question that risks breaking the Israeli economy. By contrast, the Palestinians, with a GNP of US$3 billion, can hardly be expected to invest substantial capital in desalination projects at present.

It being understood that Israel will not simply and purely abandon its claim on this water, it is proposed that the following guidelines be adopted in the water negotiations during the interim period (and perhaps beyond):

1. These proposals, if accepted, would not prejudice the legitimate water claims of either party in the negotiations on the final status of the Territories, which will begin in the third year of the interim period.

2. These proposals are made with the idea that a broader agreement will be signed, including all the riparians of the Jordan basin.

3. Water is a fundamental human right. Every resident of the region between the Mediterranean and the Jordan possesses the same equal rights to high-quality water.

Water management requires cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians

4. The principle underlying these proposals is cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians with regard to the use, distribution, conservation, development, and management of the common water resources.

5. As stipulated in the Declaration of Principles concerning the arrangements for Autonomy during the interim phase (article VII, number 4), the Palestinians will have to establish an independent Authority managing water. This Water Authority will have to be the responsible institution that controls and manages the use, distribution, and conservation of the water resources under its control.

6. These proposals aim to establish the principle that minimum norms for the allocation of water must be accepted and implemented. It is recommended that a Minimum Water Need (MWN) be established and that each resident of the region between the Mediterranean and the Jordan receive (on a per capita basis) a quantity of water equal to the MWN.

7. The Palestinians must receive full and immediate control of the eastern aquifer (Wadi Keir, Wadi Uja, Ein Fashkha). This aquifer currently provides 81 Mm³ of fresh water and 70 Mm³ of salt water. Of this quantity, 38 Mm³ of fresh water and 20 Mm³ of salt water are currently used by the Palestinians, and 35 Mm³ of fresh water are used for Israeli settlements. There remain 50 Mm³ of salt water currently unused.

8. As stipulated in the Declaration of Principles on the arrangements during the interim period of Autonomy (article III, number 1), a Joint Monitoring Commission would be established by Israel and the Palestinians to monitor all the common water resources. These include the (western) mountain aquifer, the Jordan River, and the Ein Gedi systems.

9. As stipulated in the Declaration of Principles on the arrangements during the interim period of Autonomy (article III, number 1), the Joint Monitoring Commission would be charged with carrying out this agreement. The Joint Monitoring Commission should be charged with setting the pumping schedules, which will be monitored by the Commission.

10. No unilateral action that would change this agreement will be undertaken by either party.

11. The (hydrological) system of Ein Gedi is a common resource and must be treated as such. Arrangements will have to be concluded to guarantee the supply of fresh water in sufficient quantity for the Israeli settlement points located on the Israeli side of the Green Line (e.g., Kibbutz Ein Gedi).

12.1 The Jordan is a common resource, and provisions will have to be made to supply fresh water to the settlement points of the Jordan Valley independently of their eventual change of status after the interim period, following the agreed allocation of 25 mmcy from the upper Jordan to the agricultural communities in the region. An additional quantity of 45 mmcy will continue to flow into the Sea of Galilee.

12.2 A regional water institution for the Jordan will be established, involving all the riparians of the river and its sources. This body will become a Basin Agency.

12.3 Negotiations will begin concerning the reconstruction and completion of the Unity Dam and the construction of the western Ghor canal.

13. The current Palestinian allocation from the mountain aquifer is as follows: from the western basin the Palestinians receive 27 mmcy out of a total of 310 mmcy of fresh water and 40 mmcy of salt water. From the north-eastern basin, the Palestinians receive 25 mmcy out of a total of 61 mmcy of fresh water and 70 mmcy of salt water. From the eastern basin the Palestinians receive 38 mmcy of fresh water and 20 mmcy of salt water out of a total of 81 mmcy of fresh water and 70 mmcy of salt water. The Israeli settlement points use a total of about 50 mmcy from these sources. If this is not possible for technical reasons, it is recommended that the Palestinians receive an additional 50 mmcy from sources suggested by Israel. Thus the Palestinians would reach a level of 130 mmcy from the mountain aquifer.

14. With regard to the Gaza Strip, the assured yield of the Gaza aquifer is estimated at 60 mmcy. This water will be used by the Palestinians and for the Palestinians. The Israeli settlement points in the Gaza Strip will receive water pumped from sources outside the Gaza Strip and near it. Today these settlements use about 6 mmcy.

15. The Palestinian Water Authority, in conjunction with the Israeli Water Authority, will have to undertake the monitoring and publication of all data relating to the planning, use, and allocation of its water resources. These data are not in the private domain. They must belong to the public domain, and the public must have access to adequate and verifiable data. The Israelis and the Palestinians will cooperate in the sharing of all data concerning the common water resources.

16. As stipulated in the Declaration of Principles on the arrangements during the interim period of Autonomy (Annex III, number 10), a joint commission will be set up to establish environmental norms, criteria for irrigation with wastewater, and to establish norms for the evaporation of solid waste that could pollute the water table.

17. As stipulated in the Declaration of Principles on the arrangements during the interim period of Autonomy (Annex III, number 1), a joint planning body will be established, which will be charged with the search for additional water sources. This body will be financed by funds raised locally as well as in the international community. This commission will work to ensure that capital resources are available for assessment, research, and joint monitoring. This commission may make recommendations concerning the increase of the quantity of fresh water available in the region, including desalination and other forms of water importation.

18. The problems relating to claims and counter-claims for compensation will be deferred until the discussions on the final status of the Territories.

19. The settlement of disputes will take place through the mechanism set out in the Declaration of Principles (Article XV).

Realistic prospects.

All these proposals are quite concrete. The principles underlying them are that Israel should show itself generous toward the Palestinians in the disposition of the trans-boundary water resources.

The Palestinians and the Israelis must together approach the international community with medium- and long-term plans for desalination systems that will allow the Palestinians to make maximal use of the water available in the mountain aquifer. Translating this specific water problem into purely economic terms may allow Israel to approach this question in terms that are not of life or death (as the water question is often presented). It is suggested here that Israel see the future of its water through policies that will lead to reforms in agriculture (growing crops different from those of today) together with investments in the research and development of water-desalination technologies.

Israel and Palestine have enough good-quality fresh water for 14 million people.

Israel’s economic future is not tied to agriculture. Agriculture represents a decreasing percentage of the active population as well as a decreasing share of the income that contributes to the GNP. Israel’s agricultural sector will have to be restructured so that it can exploit its great advantage — agricultural engineering — through high investments in Research and Development. It is already cheaper to import many of the water-intensive products such as bananas or citrus fruits than to grow them or even to export them. An exported orange is little more than a prettily presented container of water. In today’s global market, it is becoming more and more easy and practical to market agricultural products. It is distinctly easier to transport containers of fruits and vegetables than water. All the new water-container technologies have yet to prove themselves both scientifically and economically. On the other hand, fruits and vegetables are transported around the world with astonishing ease and speed. Grand chimerical pipelines such as the Peace Canal project or the mini Peace Pipeline are costly and outdated concepts. When food security is no longer a question in the world in which we live, then water can be brought back to realistic perspectives.

The security of the water supply must be maintained principally for domestic use. Israel and Palestine have enough good-quality fresh water for about 14 million people between the sea and the Jordan. We do not have to eliminate agriculture, but we must restructure the agricultural market in an economic manner. The Palestinians can still develop their agricultural sector, for they still need labor-intensive economic sectors such as field crops, flowers, and fruit plantations. Israel, on the other hand, can afford to concentrate on scientifically advanced agriculture, employing less labor, such as the development of new seeds, produced by genetic engineering, which will be sold abroad at very high prices, at low water costs and low labor intensity. Israel can also afford to devote itself to high-yield greenhouse agriculture, mainly with export aims toward the markets of Europe, the United States, and perhaps the Gulf States, already dependent when it comes to imported fruits and vegetables.

A common interest.

Many Israeli farmers would be strongly opposed to the present suggestions. The answer to be given them is that, even without a water crisis, the agricultural sector is going to be revised and changed. Two and a half percent of the active population cannot dictate the macro-needs of the country. The individual farmers who lose their source of income will have to be compensated by the State in an adequate form. This is already the case, for the economic trade agreement between Israel and the P.L.O. will put out of play certain sectors of Israel’s agriculture, since the Palestinians will produce the same goods for less money.

Finally, the Palestinians too will have to face the possibility of making revisions in their agricultural sector, but this prospect still has at least ten years to wait. In the meantime, by agreeing to let the Palestinians have the major part of the water from the mountain aquifer, Israel will adapt to a lesser use of water for its agriculture. Israel will begin to become an importer of certain agricultural products. In the near future these products will be bought from the Palestinians, and in a more distant future, instead of buying water from Turkey, Israel will buy citrus fruits and other fruits and vegetables from Spain, Morocco, Italy, Turkey, and other countries. Chiquita bananas will replace the bananas of the Jordan Valley. Israel will continue to grow sophisticated flowers for export to Europe, and winter tomatoes and other vegetables as crops that bring in money. The Palestinians will have their fair share of the mountain aquifer (entirely, within ten years). At that point the Palestinians will have to begin thinking about new water sources and new water policies.

If the water conflict between Israel and the Palestinians can be brought back to its own perspective and its own proportions, Israel will find the possibility of being generous toward the Palestinians. This will serve as more than a gesture of goodwill. It will provide the Palestinians with another program of financial assistance. It could open the road to greater cooperation in water and agricultural technologies. It could also help to eliminate little by little certain grudges of the past. Israel will have to make investments in desalination technologies (which it will have to make in any case). By linking this plan to the peace process, the international community will help finance the costs of Israel’s generosity toward the Palestinians. To adopt this plan would be in the interest of the Israelis, no less than in that of the Palestinians.

G.B. (translation: Izio Rosenman)