Interview conducted in English on March 24, 2016.
INTRODUCTION
In this interview, Yaniv Saguy addresses the work of the organization Givat Haviva, an organization that over the years has become an indisputable leader in the promotion of an inclusive and just society in Israel. He recalls in particular what a better knowledge of the other, a more sincere relation to alterity, as well as the implementation of educational programs adapted to realities, could bring to Israeli civil society. Finally, he highlights the necessity of a swift relaunching of the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, which, in his view, is one of the sine qua non conditions for improving coexistence within Israel’s borders, between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs.
ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTS
Could you tell us more about Givat Haviva?
Givat Haviva is a non-profit organization, founded in 1949, which is part of the National Education Center of the Kibbutz Federation in Israel. Givat Haviva is the oldest organization in the field of reconciliation between Arabs and Jews in Israel. Since its founding, the organization has developed a set of programs that are altogether unique of their kind. The structure is above all dedicated to the promotion of coexistence, to the promotion of an inclusive and just society. The Givat Haviva Center thus participates in the facilitation of intercommunal projects, in the implementation of informal educational programs, in the organization of seminars, workshops, and conferences. Givat Haviva is today a leader in this field, a genuine instigator of change. The structure notably received the UNESCO Prize for Peace Education, in recognition of its precious contribution to Jewish-Arab reconciliation.
Let’s talk a little about education. You have solid experience in implementing informal educational programs. What, in your view, are the advantages of such programs compared with conventional programs?
To my mind, informal and formal education do not substitute for one another; they must complement each other. Formal education concentrates on the acquisition of academic knowledge, essential for children. But the great interest of informal education is that it allows young people more to open themselves to the other, to exchange. In all our programs, the emphasis is placed on conversation, on the sharing of experiences. These are new opportunities that we try to offer young people. To understand the one who is different, to discover one another, is essential. We teach more about alterity, and we insist on the elements that resemble us. All of this is necessary in order to build a society of coexistence, where each one can find the place that is his due.
How do all those concerned (adult and child participants) receive the message borne by Givat Haviva, and how do they identify with it?
We receive, in general, very good feedback. We can measure it quantitatively among the young people who participate in the activities put in place. They are very receptive to the message we carry concerning coexistence, concerning the necessity of creating a just and inclusive society. They are sensitive to this kind of discourse. That is a very good thing. Among the parents, the feedback we receive often varies according to their political opinions. It varies according to the living environment: if they are “kibbutzniks” [people who live on a kibbutz], they will be more sensitive to this type of discourse. Conversely, in more conservative milieus, we have to explain our approach. Some families do not understand. Finally, other minority groups do not wish to participate at all — I am thinking notably of the Jews belonging to the religious-Zionist current. We have to work with that. Our work consists in building bridges, in finding connections with these individuals, even if, at first sight, they do not declare themselves interested.
Does Givat Haviva benefit from sufficient support from the government? If the answer is no, do you know why?
First of all, I must clarify that Givat Haviva is not present solely in the field of education and coexistence. We have several strings to our bow. We develop projects in the field of equality, of local politics, in the artistic field, in intercommunal dialogue, economic development, etc. As regards education, it is true that the government offers us limited support, even though we are the largest organization in the field of informal education and the program is a success. I think it is not among the government’s current priorities, and that is a shame. It’s simple: without the subsidies that reach us from Europe and the United States, we would not be in a position to develop our education program for a “just and inclusive society.”
One hears little about this kind of initiative in Israel — why? Is it a field of action completely neglected?
It is not a neglected sector, quite the contrary! Nonetheless, I think this type of initiative ought to be brought into the light more, all the more so since the organizations working in this field carry out tremendous work. I am thinking in particular of the NGO “Hand in Hand,” which has created six mixed schools where Jewish and Arab pupils are mingled and learn together. The results are very promising for what lies ahead. [Editor’s note: In the Israeli educational system, Jewish and Arab schools are separated.]
What are Givat Haviva’s upcoming projects?
Our programs are evolving in the right direction. The example of our language-enrichment program Yihyeh B’Seder [“Everything will be all right”] is convincing. It is a program that extends over three years. All the classes are delivered by Jewish teachers whose mother tongue is Hebrew. As early as 2014–2015, the pilot program was put in place in 11 Arab schools, and at the beginning only 83 pupils benefited from it. For the 2015–2016 school year, it expanded to 16 additional schools, which represents 269 classes, that is, 10,222 pupils. In total, according to our forecasts, 125 Arab schools should benefit from the Yihyeh B’Seder program by 2018. That will represent nearly 80,000 pupils across the entire national territory! It is an enormous victory. Other projects are also going to be launched starting in the new school year, notably a new program on the theme of “coexistence,” a program adapted to the youngest children. We also intend to create a new school: Arab Excellence. And we are preparing for a turning point in the history of Givat Haviva: the redevelopment of the campus, which will host the future International University of Givat Haviva.
IN LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS, WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT IN THE FUTURE?
Looking back at the violence that has shaken the country since October 2015. Is this type of violence — what the media have called the “Intifada of the knives” — destined to become widespread in the future? Can one still hope, in the near future, for a relaunching of talks between Israelis and Palestinians?
Today, it is true, it is difficult to envisage a relaunching of the peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. I would say there are three principal reasons for this. The first of these reasons is the manifest disinterest of the current government as regards relaunching talks with the Palestinian Authority. If there is a serious resumption of the peace negotiations, the government loses credibility. It also loses a part of its electoral base. In my view, in this context, there is very little will on the part of those in power to find new common ground with the Palestinians. Only pressure from the international community would today be in a position to unblock this situation.
This brings us to the second point: the stalling of the negotiations can also find part of its explanation in the future presidential elections in the United States. The American administration is currently in a phase of transition; the pressure has eased somewhat. I think nothing will happen before the end of January 2017. It will probably even be necessary to wait several months before knowing the attitude of the new American administration in the Middle East.
I remember the promises made under the Obama administration. As early as 2011, Obama had extended a hand to the Arab world. Much later, the Kerry initiative on the Israeli-Palestinian dossier also gave a little hope back. But in the end, it did not come to anything. As we speak, I do not see any real pressure from the international community either. The geopolitical configuration has also evolved a great deal in three years. Other current events now hold center stage: the refugee crisis, the presence of Daesh in Syria and Iraq, as well as the multiplication of terrorist attacks targeting the Near East, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has thus found itself relegated to the background, given the state of international affairs. That is our problem number 2.
The question of Palestinian leadership constitutes our third problem. The first reason lies in the standoff between Hamas and Fatah, and by extension in the choice of the negotiating line to adopt with Israel. In the end, this division benefits the Israelis in the balance of power. The other question is that of the transfer of power: Mahmoud Abbas is getting on in years; his succession is already being contemplated on the Palestinian side. But one question remains in suspense: to whom? The fact is that there is no longer, to this day, a natural leader on the Palestinian side, as Yasser Arafat was able to be. On the Palestinian side too, it seems that the implementation of new initiatives is becoming more and more difficult. Consequently, my assessment is the following: as long as these three principal questions are not settled, a resumption of dialogue is hardly conceivable.
Concerning the relaunching of negotiations, must one find another direction? Certain voices say that the Oslo Accords are definitively dead and buried — what do you reply to that?
My reply is the following: I think the Oslo Accords, in many respects, have been buried for a long time. In 1993, these accords were supposed to lead to the creation of a Palestinian state, which should have taken effect in 1999. But, 17 years later, there is still no Palestinian state. The objectives established in 1993 have not been met. And yet it was, at the time, a historic event. The idea of the Oslo Accords was the following: we develop stages over a period of six years, yesterday’s enemies are reconciled and opt for a two-state solution. But the peace process was interrupted prematurely, at the moment when Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated. In the aftermath, Shimon Peres had taken over the post of Prime Minister, then Benjamin Netanyahu had won the elections of June 1996 and replaced Shimon Peres in turn. There is no direct correlation with the elections, but one can say that it is truly from 1996 onward that the Oslo Accords lost their meaning. Between 1996 and 1999, it was very complicated.
In spite of everything, the mechanisms instituted by the Oslo Accords are still in force. There is a certain territorial reality that one cannot ignore. The West Bank is divided into three zones: A, B, and C. In zone A, the Palestinians have full authority. In zone B, the Palestinian Authority retains its authority even if security is shared with the Israeli forces. Finally, in zone C, Israel has full authority. Zone C, which includes the Israeli settlements as well as East Jerusalem, represents nearly 60% of the territories. Israel continues to conduct military operations there (targeted eliminations, destruction of infrastructure or of houses). Consequently, although the spirit of Oslo is definitively buried, the Israeli occupation follows its course and, on the Palestinian side, one still does not see the light at the end of the tunnel. It is hard to admit; but, instead of serving peace, the Oslo Accords serve the occupation.
Could the unstable context of the region by itself explain the stagnation of the peace process? By way of example, did the aborted revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as the presence of Daesh in the region, affect in any way the talks between Israelis and Palestinians?
Obviously, the regional context has a strong impact. As it happens, it suits the Prime Minister. For the Prime Minister, we live in a “region full of predators” (these are the words he uses to speak of the neighboring countries). Consequently, he considers that the slightest error, the slightest small concession, leads these “predators” to become stronger. The only valid response is a security policy of great scope — to remain strong, and to concede nothing to the “enemies.” That is more or less the idea that dominates in Israeli domestic politics.
This is not without consequences. As the Prime Minister persists in this increasingly right-wing policy, one sees the possibility of a two-state solution receding. Thus, what is taking shape over the long term is a total annexation of the West Bank. If that is the case, Israel will lose its status as a Jewish state (for, demographically, the Jews will become a minority in this state). It will not be a democratic state either. I would call this “anti-Zionism,” in the proper sense of the term.
Indeed, what is Zionism? It is a political paradigm that takes shape at the end of the nineteenth century and that, originally, has the aim of offering a national home for all the Jews of the diaspora. Over time, Zionism became the ultimate chance for the Jewish people to secure a stable future, on the basis of a democratic homeland. Today, it is this very essence of Zionism, the essence of Israel, that is being lost. If one day Israel completes the annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, I will no longer be in a position to live in my country. This will have no other effect than to increase antisemitism, which will itself be principally motivated by a hatred of Israel. It will also have, as a consequence, the multiplication of terrorist attacks. I think that this policy, besides being profoundly anti-Zionist, is profoundly dangerous.
On these questions, what is the discourse that dominates on the left?
It is relatively complex, but one can observe broad tendencies. The center, as a general rule, considers that the occupation must be limited and that a return to the 1967 borders is desirable, as a necessary condition for Israel to remain truly a Jewish and democratic state. On the left of the political chessboard, it is the same thing — with the difference that we do not disregard the Palestinian question, both in the West Bank and in Gaza. Another problematic: that of the Israeli Arab minorities, who today represent around 20% of the Israeli population, which poses the question of a democracy founded on equality for all Israeli citizens, Israeli Arabs included. For the left, as long as these questions of an internal and external order are not dealt with, we will not be in a position to live in peace with a future Palestinian state.
The continuation of the policy of Jewish settlement in the West Bank indisputably reinforces the mistrust, the frustration, and the skepticism on the Palestinian side. Do you think that a withdrawal of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank would be the solution?
That is, to my mind, problem number 1 for the Palestinians. Even before the presence of Tsahal [the Israel Defense Forces] in the territories. If not all the settlers who inhabit these illegal settlements are violent individuals, some of these settlers are genuine zealots, provocateurs. Some are “terrorists in potential” — one has to look reality in the face.
For the Palestinians, the expansion of the settlements shows what the current Israeli government truly desires. What matters most to them are not the speeches, but Netanyahu’s acts. If the settlements are evacuated, it would be a sign for the Palestinians that Israel truly wants peace. That would create a very different attitude on their part. No more attacks, no more uprisings. But Israel will do none of this as long as it does not have a certain number of guarantees from the Palestinian Authority. In 2005, during the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Israel evacuated 12,000 Jewish settlers. But the situation worsened, notably with the arrival of Hamas in 2007. At present, nearly 400,000 Israeli settlers are still installed in the West Bank. If their withdrawal is carried out by force, without any prior agreement, without any consultation with the Israeli government, that could no doubt lead to a civil war. These individuals also see themselves as resistance fighters; they are ideologically very solid.
In the polls, a very divided sentiment appears within civil society: Israelis remain in the majority favorable to the two-state solution, even though they are at the same time convinced that this solution will probably never come to fruition. Is the multiplication of Palestinian attacks in Israel the sole reason for this tendency? How do you explain it?
No, it is not the sole reason, even if such events contribute strongly to it. I think, indeed, that the majority of Israeli civil society is still in favor of a two-state solution. Even after ten years of a hard right-wing policy, people continue to think that it is the best solution. The same goes within Palestinian civil society. That is good news.
In a perfect world, we would all be the first to want to live in peace, with a territory based on the 1967 lines. But the situation has unfortunately evolved a great deal. On the Israeli side, what often comes up in the discourse is that one no longer finds anyone to dialogue with, to negotiate with. And there is also this fear of being attacked, in the event that Israel returned the occupied territories to the Palestinian Authority. The example that comes up all the time is that of the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from Gaza in 2005, a tiny strip of land that has since become the stronghold of Hamas and other terrorist movements.
No one wants to commit the same error in the West Bank. That said, in the framework of negotiations, the withdrawal of the military forces from the West Bank could be an ultimate arrangement, but for the moment no political or military force can promise Israel that its territory will not be attacked. Moreover, a large part of the right considers that this will never be possible. Since it seems impossible to them, Benjamin Netanyahu has made the choice of building a barrier more than 700 km long, and 8 meters high in places. He wants to concede nothing. The other argument that comes up on the right is that if we do not occupy the West Bank, “we will have to fight the terrorists in Tel Aviv.” But I personally think that this is a great fantasy; it is not the true reality.
On the contrary, I think that the argument “there is no one to dialogue with” is a false argument. It has been used in Israel for a long time, with the aim of preserving the status quo and maintaining the occupation. In my view, one can consider Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) a true partner: he is against terrorism, he wishes to find a peaceful solution, and he is in general disposed to accept the conditions set by the Israelis. Moreover, the Palestinians know what is feasible and what is possible within the framework of negotiations.
At present, it is unfortunately fear that dominates in each camp. There are no longer anything but accusatory discourses, which galvanize the crowds, instrumentalize the fears and the frustrations. This creates a common mistrust. It is a very current, very contemporary phenomenon, even if it has always existed. Look at what is happening in other countries: the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States. People “surf” on the fear of others. We build ourselves mental barriers, then we contemplate building barriers, walls for real.
If we know that this conflict is above all political and territorial, we have seen over the past few years the gradual rise of a certain religious fundamentalism, on both sides. Has the Israeli-Palestinian conflict become a conflict more religious than territorial and political? How are things going to evolve in the coming years, in your view?
It is true that the religious dimension of the conflict occupies more and more space today, to the point of sometimes obscuring the real stakes, which are above all political and territorial. The rise of religious fundamentalism poisons the situation more than it appeases it. Often, this fundamentalism transforms into a genuine ideology, an ideology that is symbolically very violent. Excuse me for coming back to it, but by way of example: if you question certain Jewish settlers in the West Bank, they will tell you that they are there out of ideology, out of faith, because they are installed on a Land that belongs to them. For them, colonization does not exist, since they consider that one cannot be an occupier on one’s own land. In their minds, this Land is theirs, for it was promised to them by God.
The greater part of the Jewish heritage is found today in the West Bank, much more than in present-day Israel. Hebron, for example, has a great importance for the Jews since it shelters the Tomb of the Patriarchs, where Abraham rests according to the Torah. The same goes for Nablus. These are places that have an important Jewish content. Our Fathers lived there. There exists a territorial reality that one cannot deny. But the reality is more complex, for there were movements of Jewish populations throughout history, nearly 2,000 years of diaspora for the Jewish people. But today, we do not occupy only the land of our ancestors in the West Bank, we also occupy individuals, individuals whom we deprive of liberty.
To come back to the religious dimension of the conflict, it is true that one finds very violent movements on each side. As dangerous as one another. On the Israeli side, there exist extremist Jews said to be “messianic,” who seek to recreate a Third Temple in order to precipitate the “coming of the Messiah.” According to their plans, this Third Temple must be built in the place of the Al-Aqsa mosque. That would, for certain, trigger a third world war, a war of religions. On the other side, Hamas is just as dangerous. It too accumulates provocations and declares that it wants to destroy Israel. Nonetheless, one can retain one positive thing: it is that Israelis and Palestinians are in the majority secular or moderate. We are stronger together to push back the evil that religious fanaticism represents. These religious attacks on each side could lead us to a better understanding of our interests — for, yes, we have many common interests, and the struggle against obscurantism is among them.