The question posed comes as a surprise. The terms brought together — Jews and Europe — do not seem, in the present moment, to have any particular reason to be associated or set against one another. Nor can we in any way appeal to the past, for we are then dealing with a domain too vast, one that would demand we speak less of Europe in general than of its various states or its various milieus — which does not strip the reference to Europe of its pertinence, but can render it intelligible only at the end of a reflection that has often already been carried out. This vast field of inquiry cannot be conflated with the one put before us, namely the relationship of Jews — European ones, that is — to the European project. Nevertheless I shall attempt to show that the difficulty of formulating the question, the apparent impossibility or pointlessness of finding an answer to it, can, in an almost paradoxical way, lead us to define more clearly than is usually done our own attitude toward Europe and the meaning it holds for the great majority of us — among whom must be counted the overwhelming majority of European Jews.
One last remark, this one already less obvious. Europe was built only by not defining itself. It did not answer to a plan, to some grand historical project, to a conception of common institutions and a common life. And the history of the new Europe is already long enough for us all to know that it is precisely this absence of planning, coupled with a healthy dose of realism and of voluntarism as well, that made possible the present success — one that far exceeds the forecasts most had formulated before the Treaty of Rome, or even at the moment of the European project’s worst weakness. This absence of planning must not be obscured by certain impressive declarations, made in particular at the outset of the enterprise. One thinks here of General De Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, or of De Gasperi, and just as much of Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet. Avoiding intra-European wars was only a symbolic objective, since in any case the Europeans were no longer in a position to make war on one another, their continent being split in two — one half subjected to the brutal domination of the Soviet Union, the other placed, above all on the international stage, under the firm tutelage of the United States. There was, on the other hand, voluntarism — stubbornness, one might say — a profound conviction of the enterprise’s necessity. Let us be more precise, even though everything pulls us away, or seeks to pull us away, from a precise definition. Not only was Europe at first the CECA (the European Coal and Steel Community), it was then the long and difficult search for a legal organization of the new entity, then a complex undertaking — often imperiled, ultimately victorious, or nearly so — for the constitution of a space, a community, a European Union. Little by little, however, the idea emerged that one had to go further, and that this economic and institutional unity ought to be endowed with capacities for political action.
And so, fairly recently, a new image of Europe appeared: that of a European state. This task is far from finished, since some of the most important countries are still outside the European currency, and Europe’s capacity for international and above all military action is still that of a dwarf — one that managed to intervene neither in Bosnia nor in the Middle East, that was pushed entirely to the margins of the conduct of the Gulf War, and that acquired a certain capacity for intervention only in Kosovo, a task it carried out, all in all, remarkably, but with limited results. It is from the moment when the new question arose — is Europe a state? — that other, still more ambitious questions came to light, and that increasingly virulent forms of resistance manifested themselves. The very idea that a European state is taking shape meets no real opposition today, in large part because the definitions of such a state and of the member states remain vague, such that anyone may one day accept Europe and reject it the next. Two currents have nonetheless emerged: the first is a wish to go faster and further. There has been talk of a federal Europe and, first of all, of a European constitution, which is less difficult because a document of that kind merely defines general principles and the organization of public powers. But a very resolute current has formed, demanding that Europe be more than a union, more than a common market — that it be a true nation-state, a true homeland, a Heimat. This very persuasive campaign was led in particular by Jürgen Habermas; it was backed by Joschka Fischer but also by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, and the most recent formulations of Joschka Fischer’s declarations do not seem very far removed from official French pronouncements.
It is clear that those who suffered most directly from Nazi and antisemitic persecutions wish, at all costs, to protect themselves against a possible return of aggressive German nationalism, and are therefore favorable to a strong European integration. The majority of French Ashkenazim, like the now very small groups that survived the extermination, wish for strong European control over possible German initiatives. But it must be added at once that this position, which awakens the interest and sympathy of many, is extremely far removed from the attitude of public opinion in its great majority. At the moment when France adopted the Maastricht accords by referendum, few countries could have arrived at the same — already paltry — result. We saw, one after another, Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Norway and others display reticence, and even outright refusal, with regard to European integration, and numerous surveys show us that today the European idea is in the minority in a number of countries, particularly in northwestern Europe — German, Dutch and English — which many had assumed would be the heart of the Europe of the future.
At the same time, there developed, above all in France, a republican sentiment — anti-European in fact — appealing both to the universalism of the French-style political system and to the necessity of leaning on strong institutions and traditions against a Europeanism or federalism that may sink into more or less overt forms of dependence on the United States. It must be added, stepping outside France, that the chief question facing today’s Europe is probably not whether it will become federal or confederal, but, more concretely, whether the European countries will give priority to the European project or, on the contrary, to the strengthening of the Atlantic space, of the Western world. Now, it is not stressed enough that here one can speak of a genuine retreat of the European idea. This retreat is most visible in Italy, because the new Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, has himself proclaimed in the clearest manner that he gives priority to relations with the United States. In Spain, Prime Minister Aznar was the first to receive a visit from President Bush, because he had been the first to express his agreement with the American defense plans which, if carried out, could only limit Europe’s capacity for geopolitical initiative. The case of Great Britain is more complex. We have indeed seen the twice-elected Blair government come out ever more clearly in favor of Great Britain’s entry into the euro, but it is impossible to imagine that there could exist a real conflict of interests between the two halves of the world’s financial capital, London and New York. Even if the City, in the last election, took clear sides for Blair, and even if a number of English Jewish figures or leaders belonging chiefly to the economic and financial milieus have clearly marked their choice in favor of Europe, it would be excessive to conclude that this adherence to one of the elements constituting Europe as a state could easily be extended to the other aspect of that constitution, namely the formation of a genuine capacity for international and military action on Europe’s part.
We are dealing with a relatively weak Europe. The European idea certainly shines less brightly today than in the time of Jacques Delors, when he could mobilize both the German and the French authorities at once. Despite his personal qualities, one cannot say that Romano Prodi possesses the same capacity for influence today.
Here, then, are two limits that Europe will probably not exceed, at least in the foreseeable future. European federalism continues, and will continue, to meet the opposition of the member states, an opposition that manifests itself at every level. On the other side, the French-style nationalist republicanism that may rally a sizeable electorate around Jean-Pierre Chevènement and, perhaps, Charles Pasqua, cannot weigh decisively in French politics, given that these groups have the support of neither the President of the Republic and his party nor the Prime Minister and his own. We must therefore turn once again toward France in order to make of it, if not an example, at least a particularly clear case of what Europe may become. Less than a federal country of the American or German type, but more than a mere economic community as it was in the past. There is a great deal of room in this in-between. It seems to me that French Jews — taken all together, if I may put it that way — situate themselves clearly within these limits, and that, consequently, the positions in fact taken by French Jews correspond not only to the position of the great majority of the French population but also to a clear majority of the European population as a whole.
The particular trait of French Jews is, of course, that in matters of international policy they grant unlimited priority to the defense of Israel. In fact, they meet no opposition in Europe to such an idea. Even the very many Europeans who have a keen awareness of the injustices committed against the Palestinians, and who wish for the recognition of two national entities, are in no way disposed to have the State of Israel run risks, and manifest as often as they can their fundamental attachment to Israel’s existence. These declarations, in all their forms, with all their possible nuances, seem to me to receive the assent of the European population as a whole. On the other side, the situation is less clear, since I have indicated that Europe was already divided and risks being increasingly so over the problem of relations with the United States. Here it seems we return to the origins, for those who give priority to the European project are, for the most part, founders of the European idea. Even if the economic situation is less favorable than a year or two ago, one may suppose that the Germans and the French believe themselves capable, by their own efforts and their driving role, of entering into relations with the United States that recognize American leadership but no longer accept the idea of an American hegemony, as was seen during the first weeks of the new American President’s administration. French Jews cannot be counted among the categories nursing a certain antipathy toward the United States, given a recent past and above all the role of the United States this very day as a supporter of Israel; but one may consider that French Jews, like the majority of the French and of Europeans, wish for the strengthening of a collective capacity for action on Europe’s part, without thereby making Europe a national state.
It is these reflections that explain the title I give to this essay. One may find, on certain points, specific reactions from this or that category of French or European Jews, but in essence there is no Jewish position that differs from that of the majority of the population, and consequently to say “we are all European Jews” simply means that the positions held by the majority of European Jews are also those of the majority of Europeans. We do not wish to have to choose between the transcendence of nation-states and their absorption into a worldwide empire rebaptized globalization. There exists a will to be European, but this will-to-be does not wish to take the form of the powerful and complete whole that the national states represented when their chief task was to fight one another.
This almost unforeseen detour by way of the reference to European Jews is therefore useful, less for informing us about the attitude of that population than for defining more concretely the limits — relatively precise ones — within which European opinion situates itself. The great success of Europe is that today the choices proposed to it, or that it proposes to itself, are relatively limited. Never is the existence and future of Europe called into question, but almost never either is the idea defended of making Europe the substitute for national states that would have been abolished by globalization. These two positions, far removed from one another, correspond neither to the visible tendencies of the present situation nor to the opinion and desire of the majority of the population.