The question of the relevance of Zionism long posed itself acutely: the place of Israel among the nations of the Near East seemed, until a recent date, hardly assured. With the peace process, the integration of the Jewish State into the region appears possible, although very real dangers still threaten it. It is indeed the first time that the promise of peace, good neighborliness, and prosperity ceases to be a dream. After a century of hostility, latent or open, and despite all the upheavals, the acceptance of Israel as a State and a nation is possible. Israel, master of its destiny and admitted by the nations of the Near East, represents the fulfillment of political Zionism. It is the triumph—practically unprecedented in the twentieth century—of a politico-national project that is succeeding in reaching its goal.

But the emergence, within the Zionist family itself, of national-religious currents of messianic essence, drawing above all on Orthodoxy and ultra-Orthodoxy, tends to impose the existence of a Jewish society governed by the Torah within frontiers traced by sacred history. This Zionism, for which authenticity confers legitimacy, calls into question in fact, but also in law, the very foundations of political Zionism as it was conceived and realized by its founding fathers.

The emergence, within the Zionist family itself, of national-religious currents of messianic essence tends to impose the existence of a Jewish society governed by the Torah within frontiers traced by sacred history.

Over the years, these religious currents have never ceased to develop and to strengthen, above all through the determination of their militants and the financial means at their disposal. Naturally, these movements, however influential, must not be confused with the whole of the religious movements, which are very diverse and generally peaceful. In itself, the existence of several religious currents is inscribed within the tradition of Judaism and partakes of the pluralism of Israel as of that of the Jewish communities of the diaspora. But the temptation to substitute for the political Zionism on which Israeli democracy is founded a Zionism that intends, by every means, to render the land of Israel and its inhabitants worthy of the messianic aspiration is a great source of concern for the future of Israel and for its ties with the Jews of the diaspora, who are very diverse and increasingly fragile in their belonging.

The Israelis, secular for the most part, manifest a growing irritation in the face of the violence generated by the proponents of this ideology. Likewise, the obstacles that the latter erect, outside legitimate democratic expression, on the path to peace are felt as an unacceptable challenge. The assassination of Itzhak Rabin, whose tragedy everyone has measured, is perhaps, alas, only a forerunner of the trials of tomorrow.

The Israelis, secular for the most part, manifest a growing irritation in the face of the violence generated by the proponents of the national-religious ideology.

Thus, little by little, a fracture takes shape and amplifies within the Israeli nation, one with inevitable extensions in the diaspora. Violence, in all its forms, spreads. Democracy, a foreign body, abhorred by the extremists, is not considered a Jewish value. For this reason, it is no more recognized as instituting a law that would impose itself on all its citizens. In this regard, must one underscore the quasi-insurrectional climate that reigns in certain settlements, the preparation of extremist groups for armed struggle, the calls to disobedience in the army in case of the dismantling of the settlements, the rejections here and there of judicial authority, the attempts to consolidate or even extend the monopoly of the Grand Rabbinate in matters of civil status (conversions, marriages, burials, etc.)—whereas in the USA in particular, liberal, reform, and conservative movements extend their influence within the Jewish community, but also with the American government, the principal ally and indispensable friend of Israel. Do all these facts announce a slow decay, or even the breakup of Israeli society and the death of political Zionism—or will they engender, by reaction, an awakening of conscience, the prime condition for the imminent advent of a new era, of a more open and plural Jewish society? But the grave internal problems seem to obscure, or at least attenuate, another danger: the rise to power of a fanatical Islam that continues and that nothing, in the current context of the crisis of Muslim society, seems liable to halt, or even to slow.

The various extremist Jewish currents that are developing present themselves as the alternative to the outrageous modernization of Jewish society and to the sell-off of Greater Israel. If these heavy tendencies on both sides were not combated and reduced, it is not to be excluded that the national-political conflict pitting Israelis against Palestinians will change in nature and gradually transform into a war of religion between Jews and Muslims, Islam and Judaism—a frightful war between two absolutes, endless and without issue. It is, moreover, because it was conscious of this risk that the Israeli government, after having for several years watched with an attentive and interested eye the developments of Hamas and Islamic Jihad—a strategy to weaken its principal enemy—finally chose as its interlocutor the PLO, the expression of the political representation of the Palestinians, and this despite the repugnance it might legitimately have felt toward it. The political, that is to say rational, treatment of the conflict, despite all the dramas and grievances accumulated over half a century, opens the way to a peace—certainly very difficult to attain, but which nonetheless appears today “accessible” with a little lucidity and courage. But will it be possible to maintain this path if radicalization continues to spread and if the accumulation of hatred and fear pursues its work of destruction?

The gravest concern is that of the internal cohesion of Israeli society, of its determination to master its own extremists.

The major problem that already poses itself to Israel is not that of frontiers, of space, or even that of the establishment of a Palestinian State. Israel has the capacity to settle these problems in time, with patience and a good measure of the realism that, sooner or later, no State escapes in this world undergoing globalization.

The gravest concern is that of the internal cohesion of Israeli society, of its determination to master its own extremists and to establish, beyond the practical contingencies, a profound bond of a new kind with the Jews of the diaspora.

Does the growing involvement of the Jewish religious authorities of France in political action, whatever the oratorical precautions they take regarding their spiritual vocation, not precisely entail the risk of an extension of the Israeli-Arab conflict to Jews and Muslims in general? A textbook hypothesis or a process already underway? It is true that certain men of religion think very sincerely that the advent of religious governments, or at least of governments placed under their strong influence, would create the conditions for a true reconciliation among the monotheistic religions, itself the indispensable precondition for a durable peace. The encounter and dialogue among believers referring to the same values and profoundly respectful of the same God would render possible, in a global vision of humanity, a compromise founded on the harmonious coexistence of men and peoples. In the minds of the fundamentalists, this peace of souls and hearts is something the politicians—entangled in their contradictions, calculations, and derisory democratic games—will never be able to attain.

Is it possible to wait for this religious reconciliation to come about for a true peace to be established among communities and nations? Does history as written by men contain examples (a single example!) that make this thesis at all credible?

This reflection leads us, of course, to question the state of France on the approach of the twenty-first century. The construction of Europe, which continues slowly but surely, opens new perspectives for France and real chances of development. On the other hand, the considerable difficulty, in a period of very weak growth, of integrating millions of immigrants into French society is a grave problem, perhaps temporary, but more surely durable, especially if one takes into account the migratory flows that it is practically impossible to fully control. These difficulties of integration explain, to a certain extent, the withdrawal into themselves of religious or ethnic groups that form above all in disadvantaged suburbs, in autonomous zones of lawlessness, which often answer to a religious chief or a clan leader but which, in any case, effectively escape the authority of the State. There can be no mistaking it: these are signs of a transformation in depth. France is changing. It is gradually taking on the features of a multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural society exposed to every current, from the most obscurantist and extremist to the most cosmopolitan.

In itself, the existence of these various currents doubtless represents an opening onto the world, a source of progress, and a chance of renewal for an old nation. But it would be irresponsible to conceal the dangers that France runs if it were to give itself over to the easy options of a communitarian management—that is to say, one that favors or accepts the constitution of autonomous groups, outside any civic concern. In the absence of a true, voluntarist policy of integration, this current risks swelling. It carries within it the seeds of an eventual “Lebanonization” of the country. In this regard, one may regret that the high authorities of the French Republic, with a touching complaisance and probably without calculation—or so little—yesterday as today often privilege in France the Jewish religious representation, which would be normal if it concerned cultural questions, but with regard to fundamentally political questions this attitude is regrettable and fraught with consequences for the future.

In relations with the Jews, who are for the most part republican and secular, this drift of power raises a smile, but does one measure the consequences that the precedent thus created may have, in the near future, for other religions? Must the Jewish religious leaders lend themselves to this dangerous game? Has the moment not come for the institutions that form the Jewish community to reflect on the place and the future of the Jews of France?

It would be irresponsible to conceal the dangers that France runs if it were to give itself over to the easy options of a communitarian management.

To be sure, they are full citizens. For ages their integration has been harmonious, and no one truly contests their place in the City. But in five years, ten years, twenty years, what will the physiognomy of France be? Does it risk transforming into a conglomerate of communities governed by the law of the strongest, the most numerous, or the most violent? Must one wait still longer—to question the evolution underway and its consequences for the Jews—until they form part of the community institutions, or until they situate themselves outside?

In this uncertain vision of the future, the religious leaders evidently have a very specific role to play. They can embody, in a society that lacks values and perspectives, the spiritual counter-power and a moral authority that, by their elevation of view, would inspire respect and recognition.

Studies

The Republic, one and indivisible, is not an outdated idea; its defense falls to the Jews as to all citizens.

The principle of the separation of the spiritual and the temporal, because it defines the vocation of each, permits the free and full exercise of the religious, which can flourish thanks to the guarantee of the State’s neutrality. The Republic, one and indivisible, is not an outdated idea, far from it. If one looks closely at the evolution of society in its various components, it remains the principal—and perhaps the last—rampart against all the extremisms and all the fanaticisms looming on the horizon. The defense of the Republic falls to the Jews as to all citizens; but perhaps a little more to them, on account of their history.

In this end of century it is good, as practically never before, to be Jewish. But does this individual well-being not conceal a fractured Jewish society that is losing its bearings and its very substance, divided as it is among enclosure, fragmentation, and openness? While posing the question: Which Israel and which community for which Jews? Are we on the eve of a transformation in depth, or are we simply going to live through one more trial, of the kind with which Jewish history is studded? •

Gurs camp, 1941, Max Lingner: Prisoners eating.