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That war, however, is what made this peace possible.

Without Egypt being removed from the cycle of enmity,

what we are witnessing today would never be

happening. In 1973, president Anwar al-Sadat thought

he had won the war. That a dashing soldier-genius,

Ariel Sharon, managed to cross to the Egyptian side

of the Suez Canal; that the Third Army was encircled

on the canal's eastern bank and captive to the Israel

Defense Forces; that Israeli soldiers were duck

hunting on the outskirts of Ismailiya, was irrelevant

to Sadat. He had taken Israel by surprise; engineered

a stunning first strike together with the Syrians on

two critical fronts and won back enough pride to

negotiate peace. The humiliating defeat of the

combined Arab armies in 1967 had been redressed.

Since coming to power in September 1970, Sadat had

tried to achieve peace by diplomatic means. Not that

he was a Zionist, but he understood that without

peace Egypt would slip into economic chaos with

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the Sinai peninsula conquered in 1967 into bilateral

peace. The Rogers initiative got nowhere. Then Nahum

Goldmann, head of the World Jewish Congress, came

from Sadat with the same message. He was branded a

traitor. Finally, in a historic speech in the

Egyptian parliament, a frustrated and enraged Sadat

said he would sacrifice a million men to cross the

Suez Canal in order to regain Sinai. Golda Meir

responded by calling him a buffoon; Dayan responded

that Sadat did not have the military means to stand

up to Israel. Both were slaves to what became known

in Hebrew as the "conceptzia" - the "concept" -

whereby war was not a real option for the Arabs.

Again, how wrong they were.

I remember well that day in the Knesset, Golda on the

podium, the plenum and press gallery filled to

capacity, I remember the arrogance of her reply to

Sadat's threat. In a speech void of emotion, her

voice husky with cigarette smoke, she unabashedly

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mocked Sadat, making light of both his overtures for
se moquer > mépriser les deux ouvertures

peace and his threat of war. I remember well the
paix menace guerre se souvenir bien

dismissive wave of her hand as she called Sadat's
dissmiss-congédier > signe de la main appeler

threat to sacrifice a million men a hoax and her
menace sacrifier hommes attrape

expression as she called him a clown.
appeler

That wave of the hand was interpreted in Egypt as a
> signe de la main c eu l d j

slap in the face; the comment that Sadat was a clown,
giffle visage commentaire

a blow to his pride. War became inevitable.
coup fierté guerre devenir

How ironic that the arrogance of Golda and Dayan

should have set into motion a series of events that
(j) ou oou l l l
mouvement série événements

have led up to the almost unimaginable scenario of
> amener c ó oou l l el l é l l oou
presque Intimaginable

potential peace between Israel, its neighbors and the
paix entre voisins

Palestinians. How historically propitious that the
propice

blindness of Israel's leaders in 1973 sparked off a
cécité dirigeants > mettre le feu c
aux poudres

chain of developments that has allowed Yitzhak Rabin
chaîne l l é l l aou
permettre

and Shimon Peres to work out an agreement that could
eu aou l l l
travailler accord

begin to unravel the Gordian knot that has tied this
l l l ó e (j) ó a l can
commencer dénouer gorrien noeud nouer

region in conflict for so many years; to begin
l djen ó eu l l l
beaucoup ans commencer

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developing the victory of 1967 and the perceived
développer victoire perçue

defeat of 1973 into a workable settlement between the
défaite réalisable règlement entre

parties concerned. Once Egypt, the most populous,
concerner une fois le plus peuplé

most powerful and most serious of Israel's enemies,
le plus puissant le plus sérieux

had removed itself from an Arab coalition against
enlever lui-même coalition centre

Israel, resolving the Middle East conflict by
résoudre moyen orient

military means became an impossibility for the Arabs.
moyens devenir

The first step was the signing of disengagement
premier pas signer

agreements brokered by then-secretary of state Henry
accords broker-courtier secrétaire de l'époque état

Kissinger in 1974. These agreements with Egypt were
accords avec

translated in 1979 into what seems to be permanent
traduire sembler

peace; with Syria they resulted in a border with
paix avec Syrie résulter frontière avec

Israel that has been quiescent to this day.
être calme jour

It has taken 20 years, the demise of the former
prendre to take ans mort ancien

Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq, six years of
Union Soviétique défaite ans

fruitless Intifada and the ascendancy of a Labor
stérile ascension travailliste

government under Yitzhak Rabin over Mr. "Nyet"
gouvernement sous Yitzhak Rabin sur M. "Nyet"

Shamir, for that realization to be, hopefully,
Mister espoir

converted into reality.
convertir

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Israel's right wing is, naturally, opposed to the

proposed settlement. Worse, the incumbent chief of

staff, Ehud Barak, and his deputy, Amnon Shahak, have

expressed grave doubts about the process we are about

to embark on. The question now is whether the caution

of Israel's military men regarding the future

agreement is to be taken seriously.

Judging by past experience, they have never been

right. On the eve of the Sadat visit, for example,

Mordechai Gur, now deputy defense minister, then

chief of staff, gave a newspaper interview in which

he said that the visit was part of a massive

deception. And what better example than then-chief of

military intelligence, Eli Zeira, sitting in his

office at IDF headquarters on Friday afternoon,

October 5, 1973, telling military correspondents,

including myself, that the war they were predicting

was not about to happen.

It was during that meeting that the general received

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understanding that Sadat was serious enough about
comprendre que sérieux assez

peace to go to war.
paix guerre

The Yom Kippur War laid the foundations for the peace
guerre mettre to lay fondements paix

now emerging. Despite taking Israel by surprise on
maintenant malgré emmener

two fronts, the joint Arab coalition failed to defeat
deux dj o1 jaindre to join échouer battre

Israel. For a decade and more, from the mid-70s until
plus milieu des années 70 jusqu'à

recently, President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria tried to
récemment Syrie essayer

gain strategic parity with Israel, bankrupting his
gagner égalité avec faire banqueroute

own country in the process. For the same reasons that
propre pays processus même raisons

Gorbachev came to the conclusion that glasnost - not
venir to come

a continuation of the Cold War - was the answer to
froid guerre réponse

American technological superiority and not the Cold
froid

War, so Asad was forced to abandon the idea of being
guerre forcer idée pouvoir to be

able to take on Israel one-to-one. That conclusion
prendre

was reached long before the former Soviet Union
atteindre avant ancien >Union Soviétique

disappeared or the Gulf War occurred. With Egypt out
disparaitre gulf guerre arriver avec

of the game the war option no longer existed.
jeu guerre pas plus longtemps exister

And as for the Palestinians, a six-year struggle
s'agiter

against Israeli occupation, the Intifada, got them
contre israélien

to get

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great international public relations but little else.

Without the Arab states behind them they had no real

military option.

Ironically, Egypt's perceived victory was its

undoing. Sticks and stones and a sympathetic media

could not take the place of strong Arab neighbors

posing an existential threat to Israel. Without an

Arab partner willing to go to war on their behalf, it

was only a matter of time before they were forced to

negotiate peace.

Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres are two men at the

right place at the right time. They have not only

witnessed the passage of history but have actively

played a part in molding it.

Rabin was the chief of staff who conquered the

territories in 1967. He now believes that it is his

historic mission to translate that victory into

peace. Shimon Peres masterminded this country's move

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into becoming a regional nuclear superpower. Both
devenir super puissance les deux

over 70, they have finally set aside their personal
part

rivalries in the national interest. And finally,
rivalités

after 20 more years of terrorism and war, hatred and
après plus ans guerre haine

mindless killing, the Palestinians and Arabs seem to
indifférent tuer paraître

have come to the same conclusion.
venir même

From war to peace, 1973 to 1993, 20 years of mutual
guerre paix ans loutchou'

misery before Sadat's message could be finally
misère avant can

understood: Israel is a reality. The challenge facing
comprendre to understand défi

the Arabs is not whether to live with Israel, but how
si vivre avec mais

to live with Israel. And the challenge facing Israel
vivre avec défi

is to believe that though Sadat may have pretended
croire quelque prétendre

that he won the war, in the long run the war was
gagner guerre la longue guerre

actually won by us. The task ahead is to consummate
gagner to win tâche devent consommer

that victory by making permanent peace, and Rabin and
victoire faire to make paix

Peres seem to be very close to meeting the test.
paraître près réussir l'épreuve